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Workflow Agents vs. Expert Systems:  
Problem Solving Methods in Work Systems Design 
 
Abstract 
During the 1980s, a community of artificial intelligence researchers became 
interested in formalizing problem solving methods as part of an effort called “second 
generation expert systems” (2nd GES). How do the motivations and results of this 
research relate to building tools for the workplace today? We provide an historical review 
of how the theory of expertise has developed, a progress report on a tool for designing 
and implementing model-based automation (Brahms), and a concrete example how we 
apply 2nd GES concepts today in an agent-based system for space flight operations 
(OCAMS).  
Brahms’ incorporates an ontology for modeling work practices, what people are 
doing in the course of a day, characterized as “activities.” OCAMS was developed using 
a simulation-to-implementation methodology, in which a prototype tool was embedded in 
a simulation of future work practices. OCAMS uses model-based methods to 
interactively plan its actions and keep track of the work to be done. The problem solving 
methods of practice are interactive, employing reasoning for and through action in the 
real world. Analogously, it is as if a medical expert system were charged not just with 
interpreting culture results, but actually interacting with a patient. Our perspective shifts 
from building a “problem solving” (expert) system to building an actor in the world. 
The reusable components in work system designs include entire “problem solvers” 
(e.g., a planning subsystem), interoperability frameworks, and workflow agents that use 
and revise models dynamically in a network of people and tools. Consequently, the 
research focus shifts so “problem solving methods” include ways of knowing that models 
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do not fit the world, and ways of interacting with other agents and people to gain or 
verify information and (ultimately) adapt rules and procedures to resolve problematic 
situations. 
 
Keywords: Work systems design, work practice simulation, model-based automation, 
problem solving agent, situated cognition 
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Introduction 
During the 1980s, a community of computer scientists working with the area of 
artificial intelligence became interested in formalizing problem-solving methods (PSMs) 
in an effort called “second generation expert systems” (2nd GES; David et al., 1993). 
What motivated this abstraction process and what did it accomplish? How do problem 
solving methods relate to building tools for the workplace today? Indeed, what have we 
learned about problem solving since the 1980s? To answer these questions, we provide an 
historical review of how the theory of expertise has developed, a progress report on tools 
for designing and implementing model-based automation, and a concrete example how 
we apply 2nd GES concepts today. 
The 2nd GES effort often involved analyzing the expert systems built in the 1970s to 
abstract their design and operation (e.g., Clancey & Letsinger, 1981). The motivations 
included: producing higher-level frameworks that would make building expert systems 
more efficient (called “knowledge acquisition”), making the programs more robust and 
powerful (by incorporating general principles rather than many isolated facts and 
heuristics), facilitating explanation of reasoning to users (especially in instructional 
applications), and facilitating reuse of the constructs in developing other expert systems 
(through PSM libraries).  
The 2nd GES analytic effort was part of the study of human problem solving (Newell 
& Simon, 1972), which showed that there were patterns, called “methods,” by which 
people applied and configured finer-grained “operators” in a process called “search in a 
problem space.” Analyzing dozens of programs in different domains, ranging from 
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medicine to physics, and spanning a variety of kinds of problems (e.g., troubleshooting, 
design), 2nd GES researchers identified these additional patterns: 
o All expert systems are “model-based”—the representation methods of AI 
programming, specifically in expert systems, introduces a new modeling 
method to science and engineering, namely a means of modeling processes 
qualitatively (Clancey, 1986; 1989) in contrast with purely numeric 
programming.  
o Domain ontologies should be represented separately from the procedures that 
manipulate models, facilitating explanation and reuse (Clancey & Letsinger, 
1981). 
o Solving particular problems (e.g., diagnosing a patient) involves creating 
situation-specific models; this is formalized most clearly in the blackboard 
architecture (Nii, 1986), which makes explicit the posting and comparison of 
model components (“hypotheses”) (Clancey, 1992). 
o Processes for manipulating models can be abstracted on different levels 
ranging from graph operators to entire frameworks for doing diagnosis, 
design, etc. (Clancey, 1985; Clancey & Barbanson, 1993).  
People summarized the conclusions of 2nd GES research in different ways, because 
models and procedures for manipulating models vary a great deal and have been 
represented in very different formalisms. Frameworks for organizing modeling languages 
and methods are provided by Chandrasekaran & Johnson (1993) and Clancey (1992). 
Depending on theoretical and practical objectives, different analytic perspectives will be 
preferred and useful. However the motivations of 2nd GES were broadly shared and not 
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much in dispute, and the representation of domain entities and processes in classification 
and causal models seemed tractable. Instead, the debate and ambiguities concerned how 
to abstract and describe the procedures that manipulated models in the expert system (i.e., 
the PSMs).  
Two decades later, software engineering has not been transformed into a process of 
assembling PSMs from a library, as 2nd GES researchers imagined. Has there been a 
failure to appreciate the benefits of a PSM library or was the vision incomplete? We 
argue that there is a parallel between the limitations of expert systems and limitations of 
the value of PSMs for software engineering. Evaluating the success of “the PSM 
movement” requires also evaluating the success of “the expert system movement.” These 
limitations are founded in the narrow view of expertise that led 2nd GES researchers to 
believe that all software tools would be (or at least could contain) expert systems. The 
limitations in the “cognitivist” (Wallace, et al., 2007) view of knowledge, expertise, and 
problem solving—epitomized by the expert systems movement—explain why PSMs as 
conceived in David, et al. (1993) play only a small part in practical tools in the 
workplace. 
On the other hand, the motivations for 2nd GES are just as important and useful today, 
and the effort to abstract, formalize, and reuse software components in program libraries 
(e.g., for C++, JAVA) has in some respects accomplished what we hoped in the 1980s. 
Yet writing complex systems remains a craft; it seems we are always striving for the 
imagined libraries of modeling components. Is a kind of 3rd GES effort required or is 
invention and tedious adaptation inherent in the problem of developing software tools? 
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To answer this question, we provide a broad review of problem-solving abstraction; 
the development of knowledge engineering tools; the shift in perspective about models, 
knowledge, and work from goals and reasoning to activities and interactive behavior; and 
the development of a tool for building work systems by modeling practice, called Brahms 
(Clancey, et al., 1998; 2005b; Seah, et al., 2005; Sierhuis, 2001; Sierhuis, et al., 2003). 
We provide an example of how Brahms has been used to design and implement a 
workflow tool for communications between NASA’s Mission Control ground support 
and the astronaut crew of the International Space Station (ISS; Clancey, et al., in press). 
We analyze the use of abstraction in this workflow tool and relate its architecture and 
methods to 2nd GES terminology.  
We conclude that the motivations of 2nd GES and PSM abstraction in particular has 
been transformed from configuring a problem solver to a higher-level problem of 
designing agents in a work system. The reusable components in work systems design 
include entire “problem solvers” (e.g., a planning subsystem), interoperability 
frameworks (relating hardware and software on different platforms), and interactive 
systems (“workflow agents”) that use and revise models dynamically in a network of 
people and tools. 
Historical Review of Problem Solving Methods 
Problem Solving is Reasoning 
The idea of problem solving methods is continuous with the long-term interest in 
mechanizing human reasoning (see for example, the review by Agre, 1997). The 
premises are simple and powerful: Good judgment is principled – knowledge is true 
belief — reasoning is mental. In the cognitivist paradigm, represented especially well by 
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Newell & Simon (1972), logical reasoning, formulated most notably by Whitehead & 
Russell (1910), is the essence of cognition, connecting perception and action. In early 
modeling frameworks, called the “Logic Theorist” and “General Problem Solver,” 
theorem proving was the problem being studied. In subsequent frameworks (e.g., 
Green,1969), theorem proving then becomes a method for solving real-world problems: 
States in the world and goals are expressed in predicate calculus, and developing a plan 
of action to achieve a goal is reformulated as finding the states and actions (functions) 
that satisfies a theorem. 
Thus, the “logicist” formulation became the foundation of cognitivism (Wallace, et 
al., 2007), the analytic framework in which human “knowledge” consists of facts and 
rules (axioms and theorems in predicate calculus), and “reasoning” is logical 
manipulation (e.g., resolution theorem proving). These researchers viewed problem 
solving as logical, mental manipulation of beliefs about representations.1  
The Power of Generality: Heuristic Methods 
Abstracting and generalizing is an essential aspect of human learning, in formulating 
a scientific model, a policy or law, or even an everyday principle for managing one’s day. 
People naturally express models of the world and behavior as generalizations that in 
logical terms involve predicates and variables (e.g., “For every weekday, if 4 PM > Time 
                                                
1 For example, when Simon and Lea (1974) emphasized the role of what they called 
“information gathering” in problem solving, they didn’t mean observing the world, but 
rather “the degree of similarity or difference between the expressions contained in a 
given knowledge state and the goal expression” (p. 333)—information about mental 
constructs, as a measure of progress in a theorem proving process. 
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> 7 PM, then avoid the freeways.”). Thus, the vision of Newell and Simon in their 
magnum opus (1972) was that a single program that represented and manipulated 
generalizations (theorems) could be directly applied to solve many problems in different 
domains, hence the name “General Problem Solver.” They demonstrated generality by 
applying the GPS method in cryptarithmetic and chess.  
Most notably, Newell and Simon (1972) formulated the problem solving process as a 
variety of methods such as “generate and test” and “recognition.” They define a method 
as “a collection of information processes that combine a series of means to attain an end” 
(p. 91). Their focus was not on the generality of the domain knowledge per se (that the 
theorems had variables and hence were general was essential for playing different games 
of chess, for example). Rather they focused on the generality of the “heuristic search” 
problem solving method (Newell & Simon, 1972, p. 101). This method was expressed as 
a program with steps such as “select-operator” and “decide-next-step.” They emphasized 
that the formulation of heuristic search that they presented is an “encompassing scheme 
from which more methods can be derived,” depending on the application. They also list 
some known alternative realizations of the undefined processes; for example, “decide-
next-step” could be carried out by a fixed strategy of “always continue (one-level 
breadth-first search).”   
In summary, it was clear from early on, at least a decade before the term “expert 
system” was coined, that problem solving programs could be constructed from a general 
problem solving method, consisting of mental operations, variously called “heuristics,” 
“operators,” and “methods” (cf. Newell & Simon, 1972, pps, 101-103, 416-417) that are 
general processes, instantiated and combined in different ways, depending on the task 
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environment. The overall program is referred to as a “heuristic;” thus for example, they 
refer to “the heuristic of means-ends analysis” and also “the basic system of heuristic of 
GPS.” This wording, where “heuristic” means “discovery” or “exploratory searching”—
hence in effect, “system of discovery”—sounds awkward today because a different 
interpretation emerged in applying the framework to real-world problems in the 1970s. 
Then “heuristic” shifted from meaning the model manipulation operators to meaning the 
domain relations that the operators manipulated, aka “domain knowledge.” 
Building Expert Systems: Heuristic Knowledge 
Edward Feigenbaum, a student of Simon’s, moved the mechanization of problem 
solving from logic and chess, which were than characterized as “game playing”, to the 
broader realm of scientific human expertise, starting with chemistry (Feigenbaum, 1977). 
In 1965 Feigenbaum, et al. (1971) at Stanford started developing DENDRAL, a program 
for inferring molecular composition from spectral analysis, using the Plan-Generate-and-
Test method, a variation of GPS. They concluded that real world problem solving, that is, 
problems that involved modeling empirical phenomena, was greatly aided by including 
more domain relationships, in particular uncertain syllogisms called “production rules.” 
These rules were called “heuristics,” emphasizing that they made the search process 
tractable.  
After DENDRAL, a broader effort in domains of medicine and biology was initiated 
as the Heuristic Programming Project in 1970. The body of domain heuristics became 
known as a “knowledge base” in the early 1970s, and the HPP was renamed the 
Knowledge Systems Laboratory in 1982. Because computer scientists worked with 
experts to formulate these rules, the common view was that an expert’s knowledge 
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consists of production rules stored in long-term memory, and thus problem solving 
involves instantiating rules into chains of inference relating facts to actions.2 
At the same time, an alternative formulation based on the notion of “schemas” or 
“frames” developed most notably at MIT (Minsky, 1985) and Yale (Schank, 1982). In 
this framework, expert knowledge consists of concepts that describe patterns in objects 
and events through relations (or attributes). Problem solving instantiates schemas and 
relates them to interpret situations, construct designs, formulate plans, etc. 
At the same time, the GPS formulation of operators and methods for applying 
operators was formalized in another framework called the “blackboard architecture” (Nii, 
1986), a shared “working memory” in which operators post, relate, and refine alterative 
models of the world and actions. In related work, Pople (1977) formalized diagnosis as 
operators for constructing disease models that provided multiple and alternative 
explanations of or causal processes.  
Researchers also recognized that generalizing heuristics made knowledge bases more 
concise and the generalizations might be useful across domains. For example, Davis 
(1980) formalized metarules that could heuristically control how more specific domain 
rules were applied. Also in the 1970s, researchers applying educational psychology to 
computer-aided instruction emphasized “strategic knowledge,” “problem solving 
strategy,” and “meta-cognition” as powerful ways of thinking that could be taught 
(Greeno, 1980).  
                                                
2 Representing concepts and their relations (attributes) in “semantic networks,” which 
dominated in the 1960s (e.g., see Minsky, 1969), was useful for tasks such as question 
answering; problem solving required conditional and higher-order associations. 
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In summary, the idea of “problem solving methods” had different levels of 
emphasis—from heuristic processes that manipulated operators, to simply logical 
inference, to domain-general methods of analysis (e.g., Papert’s (1972) “thinking like a 
mathematician”). Researchers agreed on the overall methodology: formalizing problems 
in some representational language, abstracting domain knowledge and the problem 
solving procedure. But the different domain representations, inference methods, and 
analytic perspectives led to a Babel of languages and terms. A workshop was held to 
relate the perspectives (Hayes-Roth, et al., 1983); in some respects its effect was to 
promote the 2nd GES analytic effort. 
The Modeling Perspective 
Neomycin (Clancey & Letsinger,1981), a 2nd GES, was one of the first efforts to 
bridge between different problem solving formulations, proving that a domain ontology 
and diagnostic procedure were implicitly represented in Mycin’s production rules. 
Clancey (1984) formulated this procedure as a Hypothesize-Refine-Test method inspired 
by the terminology of GPS, implemented as a hierarchical set of “tasks” consisting of 
metarules for constructing a situation-specific model (e.g., a patient diagnosis) from the 
domain model. Clancey (1985; 1986; 1989; 1992) also claimed that all expert systems 
necessarily contained models and that all heuristic programs were necessarily 
constructing situation-specific models by applying operators that manipulated a general 
model of facts and associations.   
The “model construction operators” framework claims that whether one views 
knowledge-based programs as modeling human knowledge or just as automation tools—
and whether one views “knowledge acquisition” as extracting what was already stored in 
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the expert’s brain or collaboratively developing new theories of a domain and expert 
behavior (Clancey, 1993a)—expert systems are computer programs that contain domain 
models and procedures for manipulating models to apply them in specific situations. The 
kinds of problems (the modeling purpose) and the kinds of modeling methods fall into 
general categories, leading to the System-Task-Operator formulation of problem solving:  
1) Problem solving involves modeling one or more systems in the world.3 
2) The task is the purpose, what one wants to do with the system, that is, “the 
problem”: diagnosis, repair, configuration (design, modification, and/or plan), 
and control.4  
3) Knowledge representation languages (e.g., production rules, schemas) provide 
a means of modeling processes occurring in the system (Clancey, 1989) using 
qualitative relations (e.g., type, cause, part-of, adjacency, co-occurrence). 
4) Problem solving procedures (methods) consist of operators for manipulating 
models (e.g., chaining situation-specific models of different systems together 
in the Heuristic Classification Method).5 
                                                
3 A system could be a naturally occurring physical system (e.g., the human body), 
designed artifact (e.g., a computer system), formally defined (e.g., a chess game), or 
some combination (e.g., a work process involving human behavior and computer tools). 
4 Predicting the future state of a system is useful for many tasks, but not in itself a 
“problem.” 
5 “The typology of problem tasks refers to why the system is being modeled; the typology 
of inference methods refers to how the model is developed” (cite AIJ retrospective). 
Generally speaking, when 2nd GES researchers referred to PSMs, they described what 
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As detailed later, the enduring value of these methods for developing sophisticated 
automation systems seems assured. However, by the late 1980s a different perspective on 
knowledge and expertise suggested that problem solving consisted of much more than 
manipulating models, and thus experts could not easily be replaced by expert systems, 
and fitting such tools into the work place required much more than reliable machines and 
good interfaces. 
Theoretical Rebuttal: Reasoning is an Interactive Behavior 
From the very start, the logicist view was controversial. For example, the philosopher-
educator, Dewey (1896), argued that inquiry consisted of reasoning-in-action in an early 
critique of stimulus-response theory, and criticized Russell’s equating reasoning with 
logic (Dewey, 1939). Wittgenstein (1953) rejected his own early support for Russell and 
like Dewey argued against a reductionist view of concepts and rule following (see also 
Wallace & Ross, 2006, p. 142). Damasio (1994) argued that emotion was essential to 
judgment, undermining the emotion vs. logic dichotomy that dominated the study of 
human intelligence. Many more trends of thought throughout the 20th century in 
ethology, cybernetics, anthropology, and systems theory built on a modeling framework 
often called “systems thinking.” These fields, operating unknown to mainstream 
cognitive psychologists and AI researchers, developed a theory of cognition that placed 
                                                                                                                                            
were variously called procedures, methods, or operators that combined how processes are 
modeled (the representation of the system being reasoned about) with how the models 
were manipulated. This is not necessarily wrong or unexpected, for operators for 
manipulating models would necessarily be stated in terms of the relations in the model 
(e.g., causality, subtype, temporality, adjacency). 
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human knowledge, memory, and reasoning within a complex system of biological, 
psychological, and social processes (Clancey, in press). This perspective eventually 
became known in the fields of AI and cognitive science as “situated cognition.” 
From the perspective of expert systems research, the essential claim of situated 
cognition is that human knowledge cannot be equated with models, or put another way 
conceptualizing does not consist of simply retrieving and instantiating stored relational 
networks and procedures. In effect, the nature of human conceptualization has never been 
properly understood or replicated because the nature of memory as a storage place is 
incorrect (Clancey, 1997a; 1999).  
The implications for advancing theories of knowledge and action are immense. For 
example, the nature and role of consciousness becomes clearer: In attentively controlling 
behavior, a person is always conceiving “what I am doing now” (WIDN; Clancey, 1999), 
the present activity. This ongoing conception is effectively the construction of identity, a 
social-psychological construct. In particular, this conception must relate constraints of 
multiple, blended identities, involving different and perhaps conflicting obligations 
(accountability) and methods (what I might do now). This understanding of WIDN is 
dynamically and mutually developing within the conception of “the situation” (Clancey, 
2004). 
Knowledge systems developers had a great deal of difficulty at first understanding the 
situated cognition perspective because it violated the very assumptions of the information 
processing paradigm. “Situated” does not just mean located in the world (which is of 
course true) or “extracting information from the surrounding physical world” 
(Chandrasekaran & Johnson, 1993). Rather the person’s perceiving, interpreting, and 
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acting is conceptually organized with respect to WIDN. Behavior is situated because the 
person is acting while (and by) dynamically conceiving what constitutes “the situation.” 
Reflective feedback (Schön’s [1987] “knowledge-in-action”) is potentially fast (e.g., in 
dance or conversation) and often involves different conceptual organizers acting 
sequentially and/or simultaneously. Conceiving itself occurs in experience as a 
(necessarily conscious) behavior. You only know what you are going to say when you 
say it (even when you say it to yourself first). Action changes perception, and hence the 
conception of activity changes what constitutes information. (See Clancey [1997a, 1999] 
for discussion and references.) 
Furthermore, not every human activity (the conception of WIDN) involves a problem 
to be solved (Clancey, 2002). Activity theory, another parallel school of thought dating 
from 50 years before Newell and Simon, provides a much broader view of motives, 
goals, and operations, including non-problematic goals (e.g., reading a magazine to 
relax), how conceptualization of the social setting affects the choice of methods (i.e., 
norms), and how a structured environment can provide an interactive scaffolding for 
guiding information gathering and reasoning (Hutching & Palen, 1997). 
Situated cognition is not a behaviorist movement, as the cognitivists feared (Vera & 
Simon, 1993), but rather one that more radically turns from behaviorism than information 
processing was able—by emphasizing that information is not given, or simply 
“extracted,” rather, the environment is both dynamically perceived in action and modified 
in action (dynamic interaction).6 In contrast, cognition in the conventional information 
processing paradigm is more reactive, assuming a kind of given stimulus and a packaged 
                                                
6 See discussion of ecological psychology in Clancey (1997a). 
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response (a plan), such that human problem solving can be replicated and improved upon 
(not just modeled) by situation-action (stimulus-response) rules and stored schemas. 
Cognitivism thus narrowed the study of problem solving to the internal (mental) 
manipulation of models of the world and behavior, viewing the getting of information 
and subsequent action as the inputs and outputs of reasoning. As many have noted, this 
dichotomy between “mental processes” and “behavior” is just a continuation of 
Descartes’ separation of mind and body (e.g., Damasio, 1994; Wallace, et al., 2007). If 
problem solving (reasoning) is actually a behavior, then the notion of “problem-solving 
method” can be greatly broadened and hence very different kinds of abstractions 
formulated for software engineering. In particular, as explained below, analyzing work in 
terms of activities—what people do and how they conceive of what they are doing—
provides a context for how tasks are discovered, defined, and handled. 
As has been shown in two decades of Applications of AI conferences, we can develop 
useful model-based tools. But these tools operate within a complex system involving 
other tools and human interactions. For example, Mycin’s design assumed a culture has 
already been taken, presuming a certain medical setting with sophisticated caretakers, 
even if they are not antimicrobial experts. Developing tools that fit into a workplace 
involves a more sophisticated theory of problems and problem solving than was assumed 
in first developing expert systems.  
Most importantly, the analytic perspective “technical rationality” (Schön, 1987) is 
reductionist because it presumes that gathering and interpreting information and decision 
making always has a routine character. Ethnomethodologists have shown how everyday 
work requires deciding how to categorize “situations” and deal with conflicts and 
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shortcomings in procedures (Clancey, 2006). Choosing among courses of action requires 
interpreting how actions will be evaluated in the current social-organizational context. 
For example, medical practitioners need to relate the choice of tests to the policies of the 
patient’s insurance company. This involves judgmental reasoning to be sure, but moves 
beyond scientific models of the human body to a realm of negotiation and compromise 
(consider the work of patients themselves in attempting to overturn insurance decisions). 
Model-based automation can be very powerful for handling routine work, but there must 
be means for non-programmers to revise ontologies and rules, monitor the program, and 
modify operations on a case-by-case basis. This in turn requires new roles, work 
processes, and organizational policies, leading to an analytic framework called “work 
systems design”—a far broader problem than the view of automation expressed in the 
effort we called “building expert systems.”  
In summary, the limitations of expert systems stem from the limits of process models, 
procedures, and policies for detailing in advance how work must be (or could be) done. 
As conceived by people, the meanings of these formalizations (whether conceptual 
networks or texts) are not reducible to more models. People necessarily and 
opportunistically reconceive what categories and rules mean, and they often do this with 
other people. Even if one rejects the strong claim—that in principle human 
conceptualizations cannot be reduced to concept-relation networks7—and even allowing 
that meanings, justifications, sources etc. can be modeled so automation is more adaptive 
to circumstances—the automation cannot itself be left alone. For the seeable future at 
                                                
7 Despite the promise of neural net mechanisms (e.g., Elman, 2004), we have not yet 
figured out how to replicate human conceptualization (Clancey, 1999). 
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least, interactions with people are required so they can ensure that models, procedures, 
and policies embedded in automation tools are properly interpreted and adapted in 
practice. This interaction itself must be flexible and sensitive to contexts. The expert 
system must become an actor in a “web of practices” (Wallace & Ross, 2006), an agent 
that can interact with people and other tools in a dynamic physical-organizational work 
system. As Pollack (1991) said, “We want to build intelligent actors, not just intelligent 
thinkers. Indeed, it is not even clear how one could assess intelligence in a system that 
never acted – or, put otherwise, how a system could exhibit intelligence in the absence of 
action.” Put another way, we need to formalize automation behaviors with respect to 
human activities. 
Brahms: Modeling and Facilitating Human Activities 
Motivation for Simulating Work Practice 
In the early 1990s AI researchers at NYNEX Science & Technology Research Center 
in New York City were unsuccessful in fielding an expert system. An anthropologist was 
hired to study the knowledge and work relationships of line craftsmen in Manhattan. She 
brought to the AI group three areas of new expertise: 1) a work practice analysis 
approach that related tools to how the work was actually done, 2) an ethnographic 
method for gathering information about the workplace, and 3) a participatory design 
approach for bringing workers into the tool development process.  
At the same time, the NYNEX Expert Systems group was competing with other 
systems analysts who espoused the “business process re-engineering” approach of 
modeling and optimizing workflows, using a business process modeling tool called 
Sparks (Clancey, et al., 1998; Sierhuis & Clancey, 1997). To be competitive, the team of 
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AI and social scientists needed to advocate their work system redesigns using a similar 
simulation that predicted timelines and costs. From the social scientists’ perspective, the 
main requirement was to make social processes visible—put people on the screen so 
workers could participate in the modeling process and visualize how the graphics related 
to their own roles and situations. 
The new team of AI expert systems developers and social scientists hired by Sachs 
used Sparks to model work practices as best they could, but were hampered by the lack of 
explicit modeling constructs for representing people, tools, documents, workplace 
layouts, communications, and movement of people and objects in geographic space. They 
were attempting to model not the idealized and abstracted “work flow” of business 
processes, but how artifacts and information were actually modified and conveyed by 
interactions among people and automated tools. For example, a work practice model 
would represent not just that a job order moved from one business functional unit to 
another (e.g., sales to provisioning to installation), but how the order was represented in a 
document and transmitted by fax, and how the manager of a particular business office 
would handle the incoming faxes. 
Using Sparks, it was particularly difficult to explicitly represent how three or more 
people coordinated their actions (e.g., in testing a circuit across Manhattan) without jury-
rigging the constructs in Sparks’ manufacturing-inspired paradigm that centered on 
functional changes to the product as opposed to behaviors of the people. Multitasking, 
informal assistance (working on a task to which you were not assigned), dealing with 
breakdowns (e.g., inconsistent orders), interruption and resumption of activities (e.g., 
when answering a phone call) were all very difficult to express in Sparks’ assembly-line 
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framework. In effect, business process modeling tools enabled representing how work 
flows through an organization, but not the work people were actually doing so that jobs 
and information actually moved along from one person or tool to the next (Wynn, 1991). 
A work practice simulation has advantages over a model that only represents formal 
organizational roles and procedures: 
o Reveals informal practices–what is not in the procedures but affects the 
quality of the work, including informal assistance, learning, sharing of 
information, workarounds, variations for efficiency, ways of satisfying the 
customer when the rules cannot be strictly followed, etc.  
o Reveals tacit assumptions about work that a functional abstraction into tasks 
and methods ignores, e.g., who notices that an order fax arrives and how are 
questions about the order resolved? 
When informal and tacit aspects are revealed (i.e., logistic issues and hidden side-
benefits are articulated) then we can be more confident that workers’ methods are not 
obstructed and are appropriately supported when new roles, procedures, schedules, tools, 
documents, etc. are introduced. 
Modeling work practice requires representing details of workflow coordination that 
business process models usually omit (e.g., fax machines) and moving beyond individual 
reasoning to simulate interactions among groups (e.g., office workers). The essence is 
always to understand and model how work actually gets done, not just what is supposed 
to happen. The key constructs in a work practice model are: 
o Activities (chronological behaviors of people), not just tasks (functional 
transformations of work products). Activities (conceptualizations of WIDN) 
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are effectively subsumed and simultaneous on different organizational and 
temporal levels: Living and working in New York, working for NYNEX, 
Installing a circuit for a customer on-site, Testing the circuit. Personal 
activities (e.g., Being a Parent) are dynamically blended with these work 
activities during the day (e.g., how a call from home is handled may depend 
on the ongoing work activity or may override work concerns). 
o Tools, Documents, Communications, Areas, Objects with behaviors, 
Movements. Using these constructs, one models facilities, object layouts in 
space, vehicles, communication devices, etc. 
In summary, a work practice simulation simulates behaviors of people, which 
includes simulating their reasoning about objects in a simulated environment. The 
emphasis is on chronological behaviors of people (how they organize their time, e.g., 
“reading email first thing in the morning”) instead of only functional behaviors 
(transformations of work products, e.g., “filing out a purchase order”) as in business 
process models, or just reasoning as in expert systems. Of course, some activities (e.g., 
constructing a plan, troubleshooting a device) are like expert system tasks. In effect, the 
nature of the domain broadens: A work practice simulation models the structure and 
behavior of human organizations, which includes modeling the structure and behavior of 
objects (e.g., an electronic circuit) that reasoning operates upon. Because a work system 
includes objects, models, procedures, and policies, and a simulation of work must show 
how tasks are performed, a work practice model contains models of problem solving 
within it.  
Draft: May 1, 2008 23 
Brahms: A Work Practice Modeling Approach  
In late 1992 NYNEX and the Institute for Research on Learning formed a partnership, 
with a primary objective of developing a work systems design simulation tool that would 
facilitate work practice analysis, ethnography, and participatory design. In developing the 
tool, which became known as Brahms, it was apparent from early on that the modeling 
language must enable representing interactions between people doing activities, objects 
having structure and behaviors, and geographic areas in which people and objects were 
located and moved. Although the AI members of the group could not fully explain at the 
time how the social scientists’ concept of “activities” related to “tasks” of expert systems 
(Clancey, 1997b), it was possible to develop an architecture that incorporated the desired 
constructs for modeling chronological behaviors.  
Three existing computational ideas were merged in the Brahms architecture: 
o Neomycin’s “metacognitive” architecture was adapted for its flexibility for 
organizing and controlling high-level processes. Neomycin’s strategic 
methods called “tasks”8 became Activities in Brahms; Metarules became 
Workframes; “end-conditions” became Detectables). 
o Activities are activated and “running” in a subsumption architecture (Brooks, 
1991) instead of being invoked like functions (e.g., like Neomycin’s “tasks”). 
o Following the “Distributed AI” approach (Bond & Gasser, 1988), agents and 
objects interact in a modeled environment—blending ideas from Cohen, et 
al.’s (1989) simulation of fire-fighting, SimLife’s simulation of animals (a 
                                                
8 In Clancey’s (1992) reformulation, Neomycin’s “tasks” were renamed “methods.” 
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game by Maxis), and the then nascent work on “simulating societies” (Gilbert 
& Doran, 1993)9.  
Key concepts in modeling human behavior are made explicit in the Brahms language 
to constitute a particular type of multiagent system: 
o Groups of Agents with individual Beliefs interact while doing personal and 
inherited group Activities. 
o Behaviors in Activities represented as conditional actions (Workframes), 
which are sequences or alternative ways of doing something; Activities can be 
aborted, interrupted and resumed. 
o Inference occurs within the context of Activities (Thoughtframes) 
o Perceiving is an experience while acting (Detectables within Workframes) 
o World Facts (the modeler’s God’s eye view of the environment) are 
distinguished from agent Beliefs about the world (e.g., the simulation may 
represent that an object is in a location with a state, but an agent may have 
arbitrary beliefs about the object) 
                                                
9 Brahms was first presented at the Second International Conference on Multiagent 
Systems in 1996. The ideas of “multiagent systems” and “agent-based modeling” were in 
the air when the architecture was invented in early 1993. For example, Carley (1990) 
presents a “socio-cognitive model of the interface between self and society,” combining 
social and cognitive model constructs. However, her formalism does not have the 
construct of an “agent” with simulated behaviors in a simulated the environment. 
Individuals only interact in an abstract sense, which causes “exchange of information.” 
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o Conceptual Objects represent mental constructs about Agents, Groups, and 
Activities (e.g., jobs, phases in an activity: preparation for, during, and after 
journey of STS to ISS); objects may be an instance of a class. 
o Agents and Objects are contained within Areas; an area may be an instance of 
an area class, Part Of another area or connected by a Path. 
Brahms is a natural extension of the knowledge-based systems concept, applied to 
modeling people at work. In original inspiration, each agent in Brahms is like one 
knowledge-based system, but not all agents are people: Some devices with sensors and 
complex behaviors are modeled as agents (e.g., robots); simpler objects (or systems 
modeled as simple objects) can have behaviors, too (e.g., an email program).  
In 1998 Brahms development shifted from IRL/NYNEX to NASA Ames Research 
Center. Sierhuis (2001) simulated aspects of Apollo lunar operations, followed by 
simulations of mission operations on the ISS (Acquisti, et al., 2002), a Mars analog 
habitat (Clancey, et al., 2005b), and planning operations for controlling the Mars 
Exploration Rover (Seah, et al., 2005). Amazingly, the notion of geography shifted from 
Manhattan to the moon and Mars. Modeled objects shifted from telephones to robots. 
Simulations of operations showed lack of connectivity and how breakdowns in flows 
(e.g., missing steps in procedures) were detected and handled in practice. 
In summary, the Brahms modeling framework constitutes a schema for simulating 
work practice, very much in the spirit of the 2nd GES effort to develop domain-general 
abstractions, but shifting from a focus on modeling problem solving processes to 
modeling work systems. In effect, a model of work practice involves modeling how 
problems arise and are recognized, formulated, and resolved; the roles of different people 
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and the tools they use (e.g., the instruments that provide data input to expert systems), 
and the environment in which all this occurs. This notion of problem solving is much 
broader than is formalized in the model manipulation processes of PSMs. 
Using Agents to Implement Automation Tools 
Modeling problem solving as it occurs in the world, within activities, provides a 
context for defining automation, specifically model-based tools. In an elegant 
formulation, a prototype tool can be embedded in the Brahms work practice simulation, 
prompting the modeler to investigate and determine, for example, how information is 
gathered to use a tool and how tools are interactively related to the work of other people 
and tools, which might involve documents, communicating, networks, and so on. Thus a 
tool can be designed to fit the work practice, and then extracted from the simulation and 
deployed as an agent-based workflow system. 
We began the simulation-to-implementation approach in the Mobile Agents Project 
(2001-2006), where we used the Brahms architecture as a runtime system to develop a 
series of distributed workflow tools (Clancey, et al., 2005b). In the runtime configuration, 
one or more agents are located on a given computer platform and communicate in real 
time with each other and to get data from and control external devices and software 
systems. Thus, runtime agents are interacting processes that interpret data, communicate, 
and take action in the world and may cause their platform to move (e.g., a robot) or be 
moved about in the world (e.g., a computer on a backpack). Generally, each person using 
Mobile Agents has a “personal agent” with which he or she communicates by voice 
and/or a GUI. The “world facts” of the Brahms simulation are replaced by the world 
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itself, which must be inspected, instrumented, and manipulated by the agents in order to 
get information. 
In the Brahms runtime configuration, an “agent” is a subsystem within a larger 
environment of agents. Comparing to Schreiber, et al. (1994, p. 29), “A KBS 
[knowledge-based system] is only one agent among many—human and nonhuman—and 
carries out only a fraction of the organization’s tasks,” we would say that a workflow tool 
consists of many agents, each of which is a KBS. Correspondingly, a workflow tool 
constructed from Brahms doesn’t consist of a set of modules such as “Inference,” 
“Communication,” and “Domain Knowledge Base”—the common components of an 
expert system—but has a higher-level physical and functional architecture (e.g. the 
rover’s agents include a “navigation agent,” “panoramic camera agent,” and “a speech 
agent”). Each agent has inferential, communication, and belief maintenance capabilities 
provided by the Brahms Virtual Machine (engine; Sierhuis, et al., 2007). In particular, 
depending on its roles and location in the real world, including other systems to which it 
is coupled, each agent attends to different data, forms its own beliefs, and carries out its 
own activities. Diagrams of a Brahms multiagent system (see Figure 1 for the OCAMS 
tool described subsequently) show how the agents are distributed on platforms and their 
functional interactions; we also represent resulting behaviors in timelines (the 
AgentViewer; Sierhuis, et al., 2007). 
In summary, just as an expert system was not in general conceived as being 
embedded in a work system, a library of PSMs is not sufficient for building workflow 
tools. The expert system notion of an “executive” interpreting data and applying schemas 
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or rules applies most directly to the functions of the Brahms Virtual Machine.10 The 
Agent-Thoughtframe-Belief framework is based on the architecture of expert systems, 
but is contained within a broader work system schema (group, agent, activity, detectable, 
communication act, area, movement) that enables simulating parallel, dynamic 
interactions among people and objects in their environment.  
<< INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE >> 
Practical Perspectives: Insights from Using Brahms in Practice 
Distinguishing Brahms from other NASA tools (Freed, et al., 1998) and cognitive 
task analysis (Vicente, 1999) led us to better articulate the practical nature of activity 
models and use of simulation for work systems design. That is, we came to understand 
how to disentangle a number of theoretical and technical issues by recognizing how 
modeling, tools, and simulations are successfully configured in practice. 
Perspective on Models (circa 2001) 
o Activities and tasks are analytic abstractions (Clancey, 2002). There is no 
single, correct way to model and simulate work. The choice of analytic 
perspective(s) depends on the purpose of the model. Also, we can derive 
workflow diagrams from Brahms simulation runs; because these sequences 
are not necessarily built into the model, their emergence in particular cases 
can provide new information about the work system design. 
o A Brahms model is not the actual knowledge, conceptualizations, situations, 
people, communications, etc. of practice—it is just a model. Because 
                                                
10 The Brahms Virtual Machine achieves a parallel, discrete simulation by managing 
communications, belief revision, agent movements, activity/workframe activations, 
scoping of detectables, and application of thoughtframes (Sierhuis, et al., 2007). 
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cognitivism equated human knowledge with models11, the model was viewed 
not just as a process theory to be evaluated contextually, but as the very stuff 
of cognition itself—so it necessarily was either correct, incomplete, or wrong. 
Perspective on Tools 
o People in their everyday lives create models as tools, including models of 
other people’s behavior and knowledge (Schön, 1987). Models are guides or, 
broadly speaking, maps that people interpret through conceptualizations.  
o In predictable, patterned work settings with well-defined operations, models 
can be used to automate the work—to replicate routine human behavior. But 
when a model-based program is put into different value-laden and non-routine 
contexts, its operation may be interpreted as wrong and/or requiring a 
workaround. This means that at a minimum we must build into the tools and 
work practices means for adapting and/or circumventing the automation. 
o Consequently, building workplace tools requires working with the people who 
will use them, not just the people who are being replaced (if any). Contrast 
                                                
11 Vera and Simon (1993) wrote: “Patterns of neurons and neuronal relations… bear a 
one to one relationship to the Category 4 [stored programs and data] symbol structures in 
the corresponding program” (p. 120). They provided no neuropsychological evidence of 
this isomorphism. But when Clancey (1993b) said that “Every act…is a new neurological 
coordination” citing neuropsychological models by Edelman and Freeman, as well as the 
psychological analyses of Dewey, Bartlett, Sacks, and Vygotsky, Vera and Simon 
replied, “He provides no evidence for these flat assertions” (p. 124). 
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building a medical expert system by working with nurses who will use the 
tool, not just interviewing physicians (e.g., Greenbaum & Kyng, 1991).  
Perspective on Simulation  
o In shifting from a model of mental processes to a model of work systems, the 
issue of building knowledge bases is replaced by designing work systems 
(e.g., including roles, facilities, operational procedures). We move from a tool 
for building tools to a tool for simulating tools and the context in which they 
will be used. We develop Brahms simulations to get insights about the 
workplace, particularly how problems are solved in practice, and thus 
guidance for knowing what tool to build. 
o A practical simulation is not just descriptive, but makes predictions about 
timing, flows and bottlenecks, and costs. This resolves a scoping issue: What 
aspects of human life should we simulate if we are not (just) developing a 
model of the technical domain and reasoning? A good approach is to design 
the simulation to provide metrics that answer questions having a bearing on 
proposed changes to the work practices (e.g., schedules, automation, roles, 
product flows).  
o A work practice model reveals unanticipated or missing interactions. By not 
directly modeling (building in) the workflows that form the backbone of a 
product-centered simulation, a work practice simulation enables evaluating 
more basic aspects of how the work comes together (e.g., whether work 
schedules of different roles interact to cause delays). 
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EXAMPLE: The OCAMS Workflow Automation Tool 
In this section we illustrate and develop some of the points about problem solving and 
tools further by analyzing a mission operations workflow tool developed at NASA using 
the Brahms modeling and simulation tool. We describe the context and design 
constraints, the methodology, the use of abstraction in the solution, and the practical 
implications for the “library of methods” approach. 
Objectives 
The project is to automate some (and eventually perhaps all) of the file management 
operations between support groups and the astronauts onboard the International Space 
Station, as performed by a job position called the OCA Officer.12 The broader 
organizational objective is to improve efficiency of mission operations by reducing 
personnel costs by 30% by 2012. A secondary objective is to bring NASA’s research 
results into practical application by establishing partnerships between research and 
operations organizations. Demonstrating practical applications of agent-based systems 
integration in ground flight operations will promote the use of such tools in lunar surface 
operations (prototyped in the Mobile Agents field experiments). 
Design Constraints 
The project has the following design constraints: 
o Automate routine operations of the OCA officer: mirroring,13 archiving, 
up/downlink to the ISS, notification.14 
                                                
12 OCA = Orbital communications adapter, a card used that effectively enables a personal 
computer to FTP files on a satellite network. OCAMS = OCA Mirroring System. 
13 Mirroring involves replicating on a local network, called the Mirror LAN, the file 
operations performed on the ISS file system.  
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o Enable the OCA officer to retain responsibility and authority by allowing for 
manual overrides of all system operations.  
o Enable OCA officers to modify how the system operates without 
programming (sustainability and adaptability in practice).  
o Be sensitive to the current practices for workflow (e.g., receipt of new jobs 
and transmission of results), timing, communications, and authority for 
variances in routines. 
o Respect the work practices of shift handovers that involve restarting software 
tools, recording file management statistics in a handover log, retaining records 
of incomplete work or unresolved problems, etc. 
Simulation to Implementation Methodology 
We partnered with operations personnel to create two simulations: current operations 
(in which mirroring is done manually) and future operations (in which mirroring is done 
with a distributed multiagent workflow tool). The future operations simulation effectively 
includes the OCAMS tool used by a simulated OCA officer; it includes a prototype GUI 
by which someone can control the automation to understand what is happening. Both 
simulations model work shifts, handovers between OCA officers, and maintaining 
handover logs. The current and future simulations ran on one month of previously 
recorded data, allowing comparisons of the OCA Officer’s work with and without the 
                                                                                                                                            
14 Notification includes speaking on the “voice loop” (a programmable network of 
intercoms), modifying a Flight Note (a message posted in a workflow tool), sending 
email, telephoning someone, and broadcasting a remark outloud in the room). 
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tool, based on actual data about the work products of an ISS mission (Clancey, et al., in 
press). 
Subsequently the agents comprising the tool were extracted from the future 
simulation and reconfigured on multiple platforms. This overall approach of transforming 
a current simulation into a future simulation and then a tool is called “simulation to 
implementation,” and represents an important example of how models can be reused for 
design within a project (contrasted with the PSMs library idea of reuse across projects). 
Analysis of File Management Process 
Table 1 details how the work of ISS file management can be abstracted into an 
ontology of file types and handling methods. The principles for doing the three file 
management operations (mirroring, archiving, and notifying) are not based on the 
encoding of the file (e.g., a text document vs. a JPG image), but the functional relation of 
the file to the mission (operational plans/procedures and software, private data, and 
exceptions to these).15 The 31 file types are acronyms assigned by OCA officers (e.g., 
JEDI for certain procedures; NAV for antivirus software; BME is medical; NFH for 
“news from home”). Files may be transferred up to the ISS (uplink), down to earth, or 
both.  
                                                
15 Not shown are file name templates used to recognize the file type. The input to 
OCAMS is a log of operations carried out by the OCA officer in transferring files 
between the ground and ISS. OCAMS infers the file type from the file path and name 
(e.g., a file name of the form “DOUG/flights/…pkg” is file type DOUG and should be 
mirrored). 
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By examining the file type ontology, we can better understand the role of PSMs 
(either actual or potential) in the construction of OCAMS. The ontology can be 
summarized by the following four principles: 
1) Operational data is mirrored and archived. Medical or personal data is neither 
mirrored nor archived.  
2) Most down-linked items are not mirrored. Exceptions: a) Files that stay 
onboard after downlink; b) Changes the crew has made to the onboard 
software that must also be implemented on the Mirror LAN.  
3) Exception to archiving: Keep a rolling archive of imagery because of the 
volume.  
4) Items deleted onboard are also deleted on the Mirror LAN. 
<< INSERT TABLE 1 HERE >> 
 
Without considering exceptions, the principles given above suggest these categories: 
1. <Operational: UP: Mirror: Archive> 
2. <Private: BOTH: Don’t Mirror: Don’t Archive> 
3. <Operational: DOWN: Don’t mirror: Archive) 
But of the 60 possible combinations of {Transfer x Mirror x Archive x Notify}, 11 
categories are actually required to cover the 31 file types. The exceptions and variations 
in notification cause file handling to be highly dependent on the type of file and 
customer. For example, notification must take into account how the file was delivered 
and whether the customer is on the voice loop system. We find some principles (e.g., 
modify the flight note if any). But when we add further exceptions (e.g., is this a shuttle 
flight or a “stage” in the ISS expedition?), we end up with seven categories that are 
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exceptions to the rules. Not surprisingly, the OCA officers’ manual provides one 
procedure per file type, rather than a set of principles (e.g., “what to do with a down-
linked image file” or “how to handle operational software data”). 
Clancey (1992, pp 15-16) found that the relations required in an ontology depended 
on the modeling purposes (e.g., diagnosis, teaching, knowledge acquisition). We find in 
OCAMS this same process-specific, conditional character—for each function added 
(mirroring, archiving, notifying) the ontology becomes more branched and specific, such 
that 3 categories cover only 12/31 = 38% of the file types, and 8 more categories are 
required to cover the remaining 62%. Six categories include only one or two file types, 
and most are exceptions to the general rule of “mirror uplinks, don’t mirror downlinks.”16 
Following the four principles listed above, we could probably write rules to infer 
whether a new file type provided by a customer is mirrored, archived, and how the 
customer is notified. But this much is obvious to the customer, too. Automation to infer 
file handling is not required, a customer could add new file types to the system by filling 
out a simple form like Table 1. 
Further modeling and automation could eliminate the need for a flight controller to 
approve modifications to the OCAMS rules operation, but this would clearly fall into the 
realm of a more advanced tool, after OCAMS has been deployed and its methods and 
                                                
16 Every combination of {Direction x Mirror} occurs except BOTH/DOWN, 
DOWN/YES, and UP/NO, fitting the principle to mirror uplinks (hence the rule is 
BOTH/BOTH or BOTH/DOWN) and not to mirror downlinks (hence the rule is 
BOTH/UP and DOWN/NO). But there are exceptions, namely BOTH/BOTH for 
software configuration files (which violates both rules) and BOTH/YES (for email). 
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capability accepted and understood in practice. That is to say, the nature of the file 
management work system, which already has a practice for changing procedures, suggests 
a manual method for updating at first, rather than attempting to eliminate human checks 
and balances. 
Towards a Work Systems Design Library: Components Reused in 
OCAMS 
Can we relate the design of OCAMS to the generic tasks and problem solving 
methods of 2nd GES? A first step is to ask what components are reused in Brahms models 
and workflow tools, besides of course the work practice schema in the Brahms language. 
Here are examples from OCAMS that relate to systems integration: 
o Agents that communicate with external systems (Comm Agents) inherit 
behaviors from a group (AbstractCommunicationAgent) that handles memory 
management and supports both simulation and real-time modes.  
o An FTP client library has been reused in multiple Mobile Agents 
configurations.17 
o The Brahms “base library” includes:  
o Basic file operations (copy, delete, checksum verification, etc) 
represented as a Brahms Input/Output group with file manipulation 
Java activities that other Brahms agents can inherit. 
                                                
17 One of the first examples of an “intelligent agent” was a program that managed files 
using FTP (Anderson & Gillogly, 1976). A favorite joke was that if the agent were told to 
move a directory in the most efficient manner possible, it might first delete all the files. 
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o A Brahms Communicator group with activities to create and read 
Communicative Acts (inspired by Searle’s [1969] speech act theory 
and based on the FIPA standard agent communication language for 
multi-agent systems). 
o A Brahms JavaUtility group with activities to manipulate Java objects, 
read Java object values, and manage properties. 
We have used a table-driven method for different purposes in Brahms models. For 
example, in OCAMS and two previous simulations of operations, a spreadsheet 
representing a work schedule for one or more groups is interpreted to initialize agent 
beliefs about what activities are done when (i.e., the schedule timeline) (Seah, et al., 
2005). Some of the specific workframe and thoughtframes that relate to schedules are 
reused. We expect that this method for modeling scheduled operations will play a role in 
most mission simulations, and more generally applicable for scheduling an agent in any 
domain.  
In OCAMS the table-driven method is also adapted to generate thoughtframes and 
workframes about file types and handling rules (beliefs about attribute/values of file 
paths, file names, file extensions, etc.). That is, the spreadsheet serves as a knowledge-
acquisition method by organizing information required from domain specialists, a means 
of presenting the model to others, and a means for changing the model (an agent’s initial 
beliefs and activities).  
After building a variety of mission operations simulations, it seems clear that the 
simulating and automating workflow operations requires agents to maintain beliefs about 
the work in process, represented as sets of objects (e.g., the files being uplinked and 
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downlinked), constituting a central part of the agent’s “situation-specific model” of the 
work system. Other aspects of the SSM include beliefs about the shift schedule (who is 
coming in to take over the role). We can expect these constructs to be adapted in the 
future. 
In summary, the Brahms language enables formalizing and reusing model constructs, 
realizing the 2nd GES concept of representational tools with components more specific 
than “inference rule” and “schema.” However, 2nd GES research especially focused on 
abstraction of methods for manipulating models. Of what value is abstracting tasks and 
methods in developing a system like OCAMS?  
Applying the System-Task-Operator Framework to OCAMS: From 
Expert Systems to Workflow Systems 
Representing an ontology of file types and different file handling operations as agents 
(mirroring, monitoring, archiving) derives directly from 2nd GES approach of developing 
a domain ontology and functional (task-specific) operators. Here is how OCAMS fits the 
System-Task-Operator framework: 
o The system being modeled is the ISS file system, including workstations, 
directory structure, and types of files. These file types are related to types of 
customers (e.g., physicians, mission planners) and two broad functions in 
which the files play a part (operational and medical/personal).   
o With respect to the ISS file system, the task is configuration—
assembling/maintaining another file system with certain properties (mainly 
mirroring the ISS file system minus medical/personal files and images). Put 
another way, the configuration task here is to replicate a given structure (the 
ISS file structure) on a “mirror” server, in which the structure of the secondary 
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system (the Mirror LAN) is subject to certain general constraints (namely, 
what file types are mirrored), which constitute “configuration rules.”  
The problem-solving method is simple classification: The file name defines the file 
type and this defines how the file is to be configured in the Mirror LAN (the options are: 
Copy, Unzip and monitor for errors, Delete, and Do nothing). 
An obvious reaction to presenting OCAMS as an example for appraising the value of 
2nd GES analysis is that OCAMS is not a heuristic program (yet), so the most trivial 
method—simple classification—suffices. One could argue that ISS file management is 
not the kind of systems modeling task addressed by the 2nd GES analysts.18 
However, the file management problem actually being solved by OCAMS is more 
complex than it might first appear: 
o OCAMS is actually building a physical system (the Mirror LAN), not just a 
representation of a design for the file system.  
o OCAMS is coordinating the general model (ontology and file handling rules) 
with a situation-specific model of the desired configuration (SSM-CONFIG—
what files need to be mirrored, archived, and monitored at this time) with a 
                                                
18 Errors do occur and put the file system (and agent system) into an uncertain state. But 
rather than modeling and reasoning in an expert system “diagnosis and repair” approach, 
failure handling is automated in OCAMS by an “administration agent” that simply 
restarts the agent processes and redoes the operations in the current “batch” of files. 
When more is required, a person usually needs to do something that is out of the scope of 
automation (e.g., deciding how to diplomatically handle an ISS crew member’s 
overgrown mail file). 
Draft: May 1, 2008 40 
situation-specific model of the current state of the world (SSM-MIRROR—
the state of the Mirror LAN and SSM-ISS—the state of the ISS file system).  
o Besides using simple classification for creating the SSM-CONFIG from the 
SSM-ISS, OCAMS uses the methods of queuing, handshake protocol, retry-
iteration, and synchronization to maintain the Mirror LAN system (according 
to SSM-MIRROR). 
In other words, OCAMS is not just a reasoning system, a model manipulator. 
OCAMS is an interactive system, an actor in the world, which uses model-based methods 
to plan its actions (SSM-CONFIG) and keep track of the work to be done (SSM-
MIRROR). In some respects, it is as if Mycin were charged not just with interpreting 
culture results, but actually treating a patient. More prosaically, this is the difference 
between an expert system and a workflow system. 
Consequently, the software engineering problems in designing OCAMS are complex 
and go well beyond the expert systems framework. In particular, coordinating the 
operations of OCAMS agents that run as distributed processes on six or more 
workstations is not trivial. File manipulation is the easy part. The dominant effort in 
requirements definition and system building involved: 1) Enabling communications 
between computers on different networks owned by different organizations, 2) Security 
of mission systems and private data using secure communication (SSL), 3) Customization 
of file management for special requests, 4) Verification and notification that customer 
requests are complete, and 5) Recordkeeping for handover logs and ongoing mission 
documentation. These are recurrent software engineering considerations for building 
office workflow tools. 
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Because of the advent of distributed computing, the internet, security concerns, 
multimodal interfaces, multiple vendor platforms, etc., having a library of PSMs is just 
one part of what is required in a practical toolkit for building model-based systems today. 
To further understand the requirements, we will consider how extending OCAMS’ 
functionality involves much more than assembling additional PSMs or configuring them 
differently.   
A Broader View: The Mission Operations Work System 
As we broaden OCAMS’ original mirroring function to cover other work done by the 
OCA officer, our perspective of “the system” being reasoned about and manipulated 
changes, and the focus on maintaining proper interactions with other players (people and 
tools) becomes more central. When we include the customers who are delivering files for 
uplink and receiving down-linked files, we see that the work system involves people 
performing other roles in the Mission Operations Directorate,19 astronaut family 
members, and flight controllers in other countries in support of three to thirteen 
astronauts (assuming a full Shuttle flight of seven astronauts occurs with a full contingent 
of six onboard the ISS). This is a work system, a distributed collaboration among people 
using diverse representations and tools—physicians, aeronautics engineers, planners, 
robotics engineers, power and propulsion flight controllers, family members, etc.  
                                                
19 MOD is the organization within the NASA Johnson Space Center that operates the 
Mission Control Center, usually associated with a room with three large monitors called 
the Flight Control Center (FCR). The OCA officers work within MCC (a secure 
building), but in another room, of one several “backrooms” where people support the 
flight controllers in the FCR, whom they can hear and speak to via the voice loop. 
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From this perspective, an extended OCAMS that automates all of the work of the 
OCA officer must be designed as an actor (agent) in a work system. This agent would be 
responsible for retrieving files from different locations (file servers, hard drives), 
interpreting documents, controlling different subsystems (e.g., software programs such as 
FTP), creating structured documents (logs), and communicating with people (via a GUI, 
email, and perhaps someday by speaking on the voice loop). The comprehensive process 
would require multiple ontologies: file types, roles in operations, mission phases.  
File management correspondingly becomes a higher-order system configuration 
problem—such as prioritizing file transfers for different customers, given limited 
bandwidth and fragmented communication windows between the ground and ISS. If 
OCAMS were extended so it required such planning, we would probably couple it to a 
constraint-based tool, such as SPIFe (McCurdy, et al., 2006), rather than represent a 
planning capability in Brahms. Indeed, some of the files managed by OCAMS are 
maintained by a model-based scheduler (OSTPV; Frank, et al., in press). This example 
suggests, just like the functional-location decomposition of OCAMS into agents, that the 
preferred software engineering approach today is not construction of single programs 
from components, but integration of modules—often running on different platforms—
that can flexibly communicate in real-time settings.20  
                                                
20 For example, in problem solving research the notion of “memory” focuses on efficient 
matching; for an agent in an operational environment, the practical issue broadens to 
storing facts to engage in discourse about events that occurred days or months ago. In 
MOD, a flight controller might ask his/her personal agent, “Have we uplinked files like 
this to crew members on previous flights?” 
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So again, we see that reusability of components is important, but the systems 
engineering problem now includes integration and interoperability of tools or services, 
not just copying a formalism used in one program into another. Furthermore, just as the 
shift from a product-centered model to a behavioral-practice model constituted a shift 
from of detail from functions to transactions (client-server-product relations), this shift to 
an agent in a work system must focus on maintenance of transactions, which involves 
substantial negotiation of requirements and resources, whose status must be tracked, 
confirmed, communicated, and sometimes renegotiated. 
Conclusions 
In applying 2nd GES methods, we have developed Brahms, a tool for modeling work 
practice. Brahms is not a program that automates the design of work systems, which was 
the original expert systems vision. Rather, Brahms is a language and tool for expert 
designers.21 By enabling designers to model and simulate alternative work system designs 
in different scenarios, Brahms serves like any simulation model in science and 
engineering. It enables better understanding causal processes (e.g., relations between 
roles, schedules, procedures, and workplace automation), measuring work systems flows 
(e.g., productivity), identifying bottlenecks, predicting how the work system might fail, 
and evaluating hypothesized improvements. 
In using the simulation-to-implementation methodology we have found that a work 
practice simulation has a range of purposes over time: formalizing a particular aspect of 
practice to produce metrics useful for improving how the work is done; modeling and 
                                                
21 Brahms is currently developed and maintained with the NASA Ames group called 
“Work Systems Design and Evaluation.” 
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simulating agents that automate aspects of the work; simulating how a workflow tool 
would be used in practice (again with metrics); deploying an agent-based workflow tool 
on distributed platforms; and then by comparison with the tool in use, potentially 
improving the formalization of work systems and human behavior in the Brahms 
language and engine.  
In developing OCAMS, we have shifted our perspective from building a “problem 
solving” (expert) system to building a workflow system, which inherently must become 
an actor in the world. Consequently, the library of reusable components is at a higher 
level than the model manipulation processes formalized in PSMs, involving integration 
with particular types of subsystems (e.g., handling high-volume telemetry), assisting 
people over time (e.g., managing a work plan), relating different representations (e.g., 
maps and databases), communicating in different modes (e.g., email, voice mail, 
conversations), and even methods for moving and behaving in location-dependent ways 
(e.g., robotic systems that avoid obstacles and follow people).  
Nevertheless, the main idea behind 2nd GES research, that abstraction of systems, 
tasks, and methods could make building future systems easier, has certainly been central 
in our methodology. The abstractions that have guided the development of OCAMS 
combine concepts and methods from software engineering and from our own multiagent 
systems: 1) a layered architecture, 2) functional decomposition of services into agents, 3) 
providing a “personal agent” for interacting with the person using the tool, 4) distributed 
implementation capability, 5) abstraction of domain relations into a separate domain 
model, enabling, for example, a table-driven process, 6) general methods for systems 
integration (namely, using JAVA to write a “comm agent” that mediates between an API 
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and other Brahms agents), 7) handshake communication protocols for tracking the status 
of subsystems, 8) categorizing agent messages (e.g., request, information, subscription, 
proposal, in the Brahms Communication Library). 
Reflecting on the appropriate “grain size” for PSMs (or software reuse more 
generally), the trend appears to be towards programs that use specialized representations 
(e.g., a science database), carry out high-level modeling tasks (e.g., scheduling), or 
mediate between such programs (e.g., Brahms Comm Agents). This confirms the 
perspective of Newell and Simon (1972), restated by McDermott (1988), that the reusable 
component or method is the overall computational process, a self-contained package 
(such as a Brahms agent). Other reports of progress in developing software libraries 
affirm our experience that a significant opportunity for abstraction and reuse lies in 
higher-level components (Choo & Skura, 2004, p. 4):  
SciBox uses the data analysis components from [the System Independent] layer to 
build data analysis packages specific to space operation simulations but not 
specific to any particular space mission. Examples of SciBox software 
components are common mathematical algorithms used in celestial mechanics 
and astronomy, map projection, coordinate transformation, and scheduling and 
commanding.  
From yet another perspective, the Brahms work systems ontology (i.e., groups, 
agents, activities, workframes, etc.) for simulating practices remains fixed across domains 
and applications, providing an interesting twist on the idea of formalizing PSMs 
(Clancey, et al., 1998; Sierhuis, 2001). Brahms is analogous to the knowledge 
engineering tools used in the 1980s with their built-in abstractions for modeling and 
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reasoning about causal processes. However, Brahms’ framework is in effect a language 
for modeling problem solving methods, but in a much broader sense intended in the 
1980s, namely how models are created, manipulated, and used when detecting and 
solving problems in the real world—work practice.  
We conclude with a claim and a hypothesis. Our claim is that work on 2nd GES was a 
reasonable, well-grounded engineering phase of research that aimed to analyze expert 
systems, abstract methods, and potentially make system building more efficient through 
tools with libraries of PSMs. Our hypothesis is that such libraries never became widely 
used in software engineering for multiple reasons:  
o The dominant challenge in developing a new workplace tool is proper 
integration into a complex, distributed work system involving people and 
other tools;  
o The most obvious automation opportunities can be handled algorithmically 
because people need to be responsible for value-based judgments requiring 
diplomacy and sensitivity (e.g., how to handle a new astronaut’s request to 
introduce a new procedure) and people usually need to be involved where 
physical reconfigurations are required (e.g., substituting a new computer);  
o When components are “reused” they are usually large programs (e.g., a 
planner) or hardware (e.g., camera) integrated into a larger workflow system, 
and such integration is specialized because it involves representational 
mapping between ontologies (e.g., integrating a camera with email and a 
database; Clancey, et al., 2005a). 
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More broadly, by outlining the historical development of problem solving research, 
expert systems, and situated cognition, we argued that PSMs are not adequate for 
modeling how people discover, articulate and solve problems, that is, the practice of 
human problem solving. The issue is not so much that people might model the world 
differently (an issue central to developing instructional programs), but that simulating 
what people are doing in the course of a day is better characterized in terms of 
“activities,” rather than only “solving problems.” The methods of practice are interactive, 
employing reasoning for and through action in the real world. Interactive methods relate 
internal system models to actions in the world in a manner that carries out the agent’s 
responsibilities in a sustained way over time, including direct observation, 
communicating with people and other tools, coping with failure (retrying, reconciling 
models and reality), and detecting when assistance is required. The twist is that a problem 
solver must not just model the world to reason about it, but actually uses such models to 
keep the world in order. 
In conclusion, the analytic thrust of 2nd GES research was appropriate and still makes 
sense, however the belief that many practical tools would be constructed from PSM 
primitives alone was wrong. Automation tools are not standalone problem solvers—
whether diagnosticians, therapists, or designers—but like human physicians and 
engineers, such tools are properly conceived as agents, which are frequently interacting 
with people and other systems, to categorize, negotiate, and communicate their requests 
and contributions in the work environment. This cooperative endeavor can be viewed as a 
higher-order “modeling problem” of configuration, diagnosis, planning, and so on. But 
the work itself is emergent, out of the control of any particular person or tool. Thus for an 
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“expert system” the most practical, reusable methods are ways of interacting with people 
and other systems to handle discrepancies between models (beliefs, plans, procedures, 
theories) and the world. In the expert systems formulation, the paradigm is applying a 
model to solve a problem. In practice, expertise includes knowing how to deal with 
models that don’t apply, such as seeking supervisory assistance for dealing with a 
procedural category that doesn’t fit the current situation, negotiating with peers across 
disciplines or shifts about who will take responsibility for certain problems, and 
understanding economic and political perspectives by which actions will be evaluated.  
These concepts—assistance or permission, responsibility, and non-technical 
perspectives—move work practice into the realm characterized by Simon as “ill-
structured problems” (1973). Complex events can call into question the validity of 
models and policies. “Tear” in models (Burton & Brown, 1979, p. 95) is sometimes 
handled by creating new categories, giving new interpretive twists to rules and 
procedures by blending otherwise conflicting values, and other methods of deferring, 
reassigning, or even defining away the problematic situation.22 Such adaptation can be 
difficult when different analytic perspectives (e.g., scientific, ethical, economic, political 
world views) are at cross purposes (Schön, 1987). Here, in saying that cognition is 
situated we mean that expertise is inherently distributed, not all technical, and 
dynamically constructed in an ongoing social process. Ill-structured problems transcend 
                                                
22 Here we are reminded of the Columbia disaster, in which a simulation model was 
interpreted to argue that foam could not damage the Space Shuttle, and hence 
photographs of possible damage (taken from Earth) would not be necessary (Columbia 
Accident Investigation Board, 2003). 
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the ontology and library of methods. The problem solver asks: Are my models adequate? 
Have I interpreted them appropriately? Do I need to work harder to prove my proposed 
actions are valid? As software engineers move into this realm, with programs becoming 
actors in the workplace, the challenge of designing problem solving agents is to facilitate 
human responsibility, not just by automating routine tasks, but by deferring to people 
when necessary, and revealing how the models might be wrong. 
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Figure 1. OCA Mirroring System (OCAMS) using model-based systems integration to 
automate some of the file management between ground support and the International 
Space Station (ISS). 
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Table 1. OCAMS Ontology of File Types and Handling Procedures. Thirty-one file types 
are categorized by the function of the data and/or customer providing or using the data. 
Transfer directions refer to “UP” to the International Space Station and “DOWN” from 
ISS to the Earth. A mirrored file is copied to a ground-based duplicate of the ISS file 
system. An archived file is saved in a dated folder indicating its source. Ground support 
customers are notified in different ways, including a workflow “flight note” system, a 
speaker-headset intercom (“voice loop”), email, telephone, or by speaking outloud to 
someone across the room at another workstation. 
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